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Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp.: The Ninth 
Circuit’s Misdirected Interpretation of the Credit 
Repair Organizations Act 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp.1 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether the 
Credit Repair Organizations Act (“CROA”)2 permitted the 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a credit-repair contract.3 
The Ninth Circuit glibly announced that the issue in the case was as 
simple as making a determination about whether the word “sue” 
could really mean “arbitrate” and light-heartedly suggested that 
“perhaps the question [was], as Alice put it: ‘whether you can make 
words mean so many different things?’”4 Although two other circuits 
had previously concluded that similar arbitration agreements did not 
run afoul of the CROA,5 the Ninth Circuit nonetheless created a 
circuit split by holding that the plain meaning of the CROA afforded 
consumers the definitive right to adjudication of all CROA disputes 
in a judicial forum.6 The court’s decision wrongly created a circuit 
split because it misapplied relevant Supreme Court precedent; 
specifically, it adopted an interpretive methodology that was 
insufficiently hospitable towards arbitration agreements.  
This Note begins by summarizing the relevant facts and 
procedural history of Greenwood. Next, the Note provides a brief 
background for the key federal statute governing agreements to 
arbitrate, the Federal Arbitration Act, and then discusses some of the 
crucial Supreme Court precedent regarding statutory challenges to 
arbitration agreements. The Note then presents a brief discussion of 
the other circuit court decisions from which the Ninth Circuit split 
 
 1. 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679–1679j (2006).  
 3. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1205 (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING 
GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE, in THE ANNOTATED ALICE: THE DEFINITIVE 
EDITION 213 (Martin Gardner ed., Norton Publishers 2000)). 
 4. Id.  
 5. Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2009); Gay v. 
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 6. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1213. 
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in its interpretation of the CROA in Greenwood. Finally, the Note 
provides a detailed discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Greenwood before concluding with an analysis of how the Greenwood 
decision erred by interpreting the CROA in a way that was too 
inhospitable to arbitration agreements. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
CompuCredit Corporation was a business that used direct mail 
solicitation to market credit cards allegedly designed to help 
individuals repair their credit.7 These cards had an initial credit limit 
of just $300. Although no deposit was required for card 
membership, the “subprime” cards actually carried first-year fees of 
$257.8 These fees were disclosed in card promotional materials, but 
these disclosures were buried within small print.9  
The promotional materials for the card also included a “Pre-
Approved Acceptance Certificate” that stated, among other things, 
that by signing the certificate consumers represented that they had 
both read and accepted the “Terms of the Offer.”10 One of the 
provisions of the “Terms of the Offer” stated the following: 
“Important—The agreement you receive contains a binding 
arbitration provision. If a dispute is resolved by binding arbitration, 
you will not have the right to go to court or have the dispute heard 
by a jury, [or] to engage in pre-arbitration discovery . . . .”11  
The plaintiffs in Greenwood were consumers of CompuCredit 
credit cards.12 The plaintiffs brought suit, alleging that 
CompuCredit’s failure to provide adequate fee disclosures had 
violated both the CROA and California state law.13 CompuCredit 
moved to compel arbitration, seeking to enforce the arbitration 
agreements contained in the “Terms of the Offer.”14 The district 
court declined to uphold the arbitration agreement contained in the 
“Terms of the Offer” and held that the CROA precluded such 
 
 7. Id. at 1205.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 1206. 
 12. Id. at 1205. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 1206.  
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agreements.15 CompuCredit appealed the district court’s denial of its 
motion to compel arbitration.16  
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
After briefly explaining the impact of the Federal Arbitration Act 
on arbitration jurisprudence, this section surveys the relevant 
Supreme Court precedent regarding statutory challenges to 
arbitration agreements. Finally, this section concludes by briefly 
examining the decisions from which Greenwood split by holding that 
the CROA precludes arbitration.  
A. Federal Arbitration Act—Abandonment of Common Law 
Arbitration Animosity 
Historically, courts disfavored arbitration. However, a departure 
from judicial animosity towards arbitration17 commenced with the 
1925 passage of the predecessor to the modern Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”).18 The Supreme Court’s numerous decisions 
interpreting the FAA19 have now made it clear that the Court 
understands that the FAA manifested a clear congressional intent to 
overcome “the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been 
adopted by American courts.”20  
B. Federal Arbitration Act—Articulation with Other Statutes 
Despite its modern acknowledgement that the FAA was designed 
to overcome judicial hostility towards agreements to arbitrate, in the 
early years following the FAA’s passage the Supreme Court 
continued to exhibit some hostility towards arbitration agreements in 
 
 15. Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2009), 
aff’d, 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 16. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1206. 
 17. See Kenneth F. Dunham, Southland Corp. v. Keating Revisited: Twenty-Five Years in 
Which Direction?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 331, 333–35 (2010) (tracing the historical judicial 
animosity toward agreements to arbitrate). 
 18. See id. at 342 (containing a discussion of the genesis of the Federal Arbitration Act).  
 19. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 414 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
promulgated over forty rulings on arbitration).  
 20. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
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statutory claims cases.21 The seminal 1985 case of Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.22 marked the turning point 
away from such historic hostility. The case involved a Sherman 
Antitrust Act claim arising out of a contract dispute between 
international parties whose contract had contained an arbitration 
agreement.23 Though one party argued that agreements to arbitrate 
should be presumptively invalid in the context of statutory claims, 
the Court disagreed and stated that there was “no warrant in the 
Arbitration Act for implying in every contract within its ken a 
presumption against arbitration of statutory claims.”24 
Rather, the Court explained, “questions of arbitrability,” even 
those involving statutory claims, were now to “be addressed with a 
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration,” meaning 
that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues [were to] 
be resolved in favor of arbitration.”25 This treatment was warranted 
because the Court was no longer suspicious as to the “desirability of 
arbitration” or the “competence of arbitral tribunals,” and it also 
recognized that a party arbitrating a statutory claim “does not forgo 
the substantive rights afforded by” a statute.26 While noting that 
some statutory claims were not suitable for arbitration, the Court 
stated that the process of statutory interpretation did not need to be 
“distort[ed] . . . to ferret out the inappropriate,” because Congress 
had, through the FAA, declared a general policy favoring 
arbitration.27 Rather, if Congress intended that certain claims not be 
arbitrable, “that intention [would] be deducible from text or 
legislative history.”28  
The 1987 decision of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon (which involved claims under Racketeer Influenced 
Corrupt Organizations Act and Securities Exchange Act of 1934) 
 
 21. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953) (holding that the Securities Act 
of 1933 precluded arbitration of claims under the Securities Act and reasoning that “the 
protective provisions of the Securities Act require[d] the effectiveness of judicial discretion to 
fairly assure their effectiveness”).  
 22. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 23. Id. at 619–20.  
 24. Id. at 625.  
 25. Id. at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)).  
 26. Id. at 626–28.  
 27. Id. at 627.  
 28. Id. at 628. 
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expanded Mitsubishi by clarifying that its holding was not confined 
to international disputes and by placing the burden of proof on 
parties opposing arbitration to “show that Congress intended to 
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at 
issue.”29 Though the Act specifically stated that the “district courts 
of the United States” would have “exclusive jurisdiction” over 
“violations of this title” and contained a waiver provision, the Court 
still construed the Act in a way that permitted arbitration.30 Only 
two years later, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 
Inc. (which involved a Securities Act of 1933 claim), the Court 
reiterated its current “strong endorsement of the federal statutes” 
favoring arbitration.31 Finally, the later Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp. (which involved an Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act claim) instructed that there needed to be a “healthy regard for 
the federal policy favoring arbitration” during the entire process of 
statutory interpretation.32  
C. Judicial Decisions Regarding the Arbitrability of Credit Repair 
Organizations Act Claims 
Though the Supreme Court has never entertained a claim 
asserting that the CROA precludes arbitration agreements, two other 
circuits entertained such claims prior to the Ninth Circuit’s 
Greenwood opinion.33  
In the Third Circuit case of Gay v. CreditInform, a consumer 
brought CROA claims against the provider of credit repair services; 
the contract between the consumer and provider contained an 
arbitration agreement.34 The court concluded that the enforceability 
of the arbitration agreement was not precluded by the CROA.35 The 
court noted that because the case implicated the policy favoring 
arbitration embodied in the FAA, relevant Supreme Court precedent 
required the court to keep “in mind” the strong “federal policy 
 
 29. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225–27 (1987). 
 30. Id. at 227–28.  
 31. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).  
 32. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).  
 33. Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2009); Gay v. 
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 34. Gay, 511 F.3d at 374–75. 
 35. Id. at 375. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 7:46 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
72 
favoring arbitration” throughout its process of examining the 
CROA.36 
With the policy in favor of arbitration in mind, the court 
addressed the consumer’s principal claim as to why the CROA 
precluded arbitration—that the CROA’s language stating “you have 
a right to sue a credit repair organization” provided the right to 
judicial adjudication. The court concluded that this language did not 
actually entitle consumers to resolution of claims in a judicial forum 
because the statutory language did not specifically identify a forum.37 
The court signaled its willingness to accommodate the strong federal 
policy favoring arbitration by noting that, even if this provision of 
the CROA did refer to a judicial forum, the parties would still be 
able to contract around this forum requirement, since the CROA’s 
anti-waiver provision was quite narrow. The narrow anti-waiver 
provision, according to the court, only precluded waiver of “rights 
premised on the imposition of statutory duties.”38 
The other circuit court opinion interpreting the CROA, Picard 
v. Credit Solutions, Inc., involved a factual situation similar to the 
one in Gay, and the court essentially adopted the reasoning of the 
Gay court.39 Consequently, no discussion of Picard is entertained 
here.  
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit’s 2–1 decision in Greenwood concluded that 
the CROA precludes the enforceability of arbitration agreements.40 
The court began its analysis by explaining the interpretive 
methodology it planned to utilize in interpreting the CROA and 
then used that interpretive methodology.41 Only after reaching its 
conclusion that the CROA precludes agreements to arbitrate did the 
court address each of the contentions of CompuCredit, the party 
seeking arbitration.42 Finally, more than seven pages into its opinion, 
the court noted that its opinion ran counter to the decisions of two 
 
 36. Id. at 378–79 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26). 
 37. Id. at 381–82.  
 38. Id. at 385. 
 39. Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (“This 
Court agrees with Gay.”).  
 40. Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 41. Id. at 1207. 
 42. Id. at 1209. 
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other circuit courts; the court then attempted to distinguish these 
cases and the line of Supreme Court precedent they had relied 
upon.43 A spirited dissent followed.  
A. Interpretive Methodology Defined—Standard Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology Deployed 
The court’s opinion began by presenting the plaintiff’s principal 
claim that the CROA precludes the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.44 The court explained that it viewed its task as a 
standard exercise of statutory interpretation; under this method, the 
plain meaning of a statute controls, and recourse to legislative history 
only occurs where the plain meaning is ambiguous.45 While the court 
noted the federal policy favoring arbitration, the court placed equal 
or greater emphasis on Congress’s ability to overcome this policy by 
contrary command; the court then stated it would keep “these 
principles in mind” as it interpreted the CROA.46  
After introducing its interpretive methodology, the court began 
its interpretive analysis of the CROA by explaining that the CROA 
provides consumers with four rights.47 The only one of these rights 
relevant to the court’s decision was the right to sue a credit repair 
organization for violating the CROA.48 The court reasoned that 
because consumers were provided with the right to “sue,” this 
created the right to litigate disputes in a judicial forum.49 The court 
explained that it was merely giving the word “sue” its plain meaning 
and cited to several linguistic resources.50 After concluding that the 
word “sue” entitled consumers to adjudication in a judicial forum, 
the court then went on to explain that this right was absolute 
because the CROA also contained an anti-waiver provision in 
“unusually comprehensive and precise language” that provided: 
“Any waiver by any consumer of any protection provided by or any 
right of the consumer under this subchapter shall be treated as void; 
and may not be enforced by any federal or state court or any other 
 
 43. Id. at 1211. 
 44. Id. at 1205. 
 45. Id. at 1207.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1208.  
 50. Id.  
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person.”51 Then, based upon only its roughly one page of reasoning, 
the court concluded that the CROA precludes the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.52 
B. Post-conclusion Discarding of CompuCredit’s Arguments 
The court only concentrated on CompuCredit’s arguments after 
concluding that the CROA precludes arbitration.53 The court began 
by addressing CompuCredit’s arguments regarding the meaning of 
the phrase “right to sue.”54 The court first tackled CompuCredit’s 
argument that, because the “right to sue” language was placed 
within the CROA’s disclosures section, it did not create substantive 
rights.55 The court dismissed this contention, concluding that it 
would have been irrational for Congress to require credit repair 
providers to provide consumers with the right to “sue,” which the 
court had previously decided provided the right to a judicial forum, 
only to then immediately take away this same right.56 Next, the court 
addressed the argument that the language “right to sue” was merely 
shorthand for the right to bring a claim under another section of the 
CROA that did not preclude arbitration.57 The also court dismissed 
this argument, concluding that it would render superfluous a part of 
the statute.58 Finally, the court addressed the argument that the 
“right to sue” language was merely simplified language meant to 
prevent consumer confusion, stating that this argument was 
nonsensical because it would actually create confusion if the word 
“sue” did not provide the right to judicial adjudication.59  
After addressing CompuCredit’s arguments regarding the 
meaning of the CROA’s “right to sue” language, the court then 
went on to address CompuCredit’s argument regarding the impact 
of the CROA’s waiver provision.60 CompuCredit argued that, 
because the waiver provision said that it could “not be enforced by 
 
 51. Id. (numbering omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a) (2010)).  
 52. Id. at 1209.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 1209–10.  
 60. Id. at 1210. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 7:46 PM 
67 Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp. 
 75 
any Federal or State court or any other person,” the reference to 
“any other person” meant that Congress had anticipated that CROA 
claims would be arbitrated.61 The court, however, concluded that the 
statutory language did not lead to “such a clear and unilateral 
conclusion” because the language might actually refer to other types 
of arbitration proceedings, such as collection proceedings.62 The 
Court further noted that the CROA repeatedly referred to courts as 
an enforcement mechanism.63 The Court also sought to bolster the 
strength of its reasoning by noting that its decision was in harmony 
with “other courts,” but it then cited only a single court decision 
from the Northern District of Texas.64  
C. Circuit Split Without Fanfare Late in the Game 
The Greenwood court was more than seven pages into its opinion 
before it first noted that its holding was contrary to the holdings of 
the Third Circuit in Gay v. CreditInform and the Eleventh Circuit in 
Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc.65 The court justified its departure 
from its sister circuits by stating that they had given “surprisingly 
little regard to the ‘right to sue’ language” and had wrongly 
“rel[ied] upon reasoning in Supreme Court cases . . . distinguishable 
from the situation here.”66 The court criticized the Third Circuit’s 
Gay opinion for “ignor[ing] the plain meaning of the word ‘sue’” 
and for concluding that, even if the “right to sue” provided the right 
to a judicial adjudication, this right could still be waived.67 Next, the 
Greenwood court noted that it found the Gay court’s reliance “upon 
analogies to several Supreme Court arbitration cases . . . unavailing”; 
it then factually distinguished a number of the core Supreme Court 
precedents regarding the arbitrability of statutory claims that the Gay 
court had relied upon, including McMahon, Mitsubishi, and Gilmer.68 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1211.  
 64. Id.  
 65. See id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 1212; see also Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 378–79 (3d Cir. 2007).  
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D. Dissent—Alternate Methodology of Statutory Interpretation 
A spirited dissent followed the majority opinion. Unlike the 
majority opinion, the dissent began by noting the importance of the 
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”69 Only after addressing 
the strong policy favoring arbitration did the dissent proceed to 
address the “right to sue” language of the CROA, concluding that 
this language was not “intended to preclude a waiver of judicial 
remedies.”70 The dissent noted that each of the rights provided in 
the disclosure section of the statute was actually provided for 
elsewhere; therefore, the dissent concluded, the disclosure section 
was not intended to create any “substantive rights.”71 The dissent 
further noted that the “right to sue” did not, in and of itself, 
“mandate a judicial forum,” and that the broad waiver provision 
relied on by the majority actually contemplated adjudications in 
other fora because it stated that waivers of statutory rights could 
“not be enforced by any Federal or State court or any other person.”72 
The dissent went on to further suggest that mere references to courts 
in the CROA were insufficient to “overcome the ‘liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements.’”73 Finally, the dissent noted 
that because the Ninth Circuit has a strong policy against creating 
circuit splits, the court should not have “lightly create[d] a circuit 
split on an issue of national application on the basis of . . . flimsy 
evidence.”74  
V. ANALYSIS 
In concluding that the statutory language of the CROA clearly 
precludes the enforceability of arbitration agreements, the Ninth 
Circuit failed to properly apply the strong federal policy favoring the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements and wrongly created a circuit 
split. By pretending that federal arbitration jurisprudence required it 
to adopt a hostile approach toward arbitration agreements, the Ninth 
Circuit misapplied Supreme Court arbitration agreement precedent, 
 
 69. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1214 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 1215.  
 72. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a) (2010)). 
 73. Id. at 1216 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).  
 74. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 7:46 PM 
67 Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp. 
 77 
which clearly establishes that arbitration agreements should be 
welcomed as presumptively valid.75 The court’s decision will generate 
confusion for Ninth Circuit courts. 
This section commences by examining the differences in 
interpretive methodologies that produced the inconsistent outcomes 
in the Greenwood and Gay/Picard opinions. Next, it examines the 
likely substantive impact of the deployment of these distinct 
interpretive methodologies upon the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements. Then, it explains why the interpretive methodology 
employed by the Greenwood court is out of sync with relevant 
Supreme Court precedent. Finally, it concludes by predicting the 
likely future ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s recent Greenwood 
opinion.  
A. Interpretive Methodologies Examined 
Though the Greenwood majority opinion and the Gay and Picard 
opinions each faced the same task of interpreting the CROA, the 
Greenwood decision reached a fundamentally different conclusion 
than the Gay and Picard opinions.76 What produced these disparate 
conclusions? The answer is that they approached the task of 
interpreting the CROA using fundamentally different interpretive 
methodologies. Underlying these methodologies were distinct 
conceptualizations of the proper interplay between the strong federal 
policy in favor of arbitration and statutory language encapsulated in a 
wide variety of federal statutes. 
The Greenwood majority viewed its task as a standard exercise of 
statutory interpretation.77 The court stated that it would apply its 
“usual methodology in statutory construction” and, following this 
methodology, quickly concluded that the “plain meaning” of the 
CROA should control through a simple, two-step deductive 
process.78 While the Ninth Circuit noted the existence of the federal 
 
 75. See supra text accompanying notes 21–32.  
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 38–39, 48.  
 77. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1207. 
 78. See id. First, the court examined the language in the statute stating that consumers 
have a right to “sue” and used various linguistic resources, such as dictionaries, to show that 
“sue” cannot mean arbitrate. Id. Second, the court examined the waiver provision of the 
CROA and determined that this provision is very broad and, therefore, covers the right to sue. 
Id. Then, applying these two subsidiary conclusions in concert, the court concluded that, 
because the statute provides the right to sue (which the court construed to mean in a judicial 
forum), and also provides, through a broad waiver provision, that this right cannot be waived, 
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policy favoring arbitration, the court immediately noted that this 
policy could be overridden and placed strong emphasis on this fact.79 
Based upon its recognition that the policy could be overridden, and 
before applying the federal policy favoring the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, the court, as a threshold matter, scoured the 
CROA for clues suggesting that Congress had attempted to 
statutorily override the general policy favoring arbitration.80  
Therefore, the first step under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretive 
methodology involves a probing exercise in statutory interpretation 
to look for clues suggesting that Congress has chosen to override the 
general policy favoring arbitration in relation to a specific statutory 
regime. At this initial stage of inquiry, the strong policy favoring 
arbitration plays no functional role in a court’s analysis. Only when 
clues suggesting that Congress has given a more specific command 
do not appear within a statute does the general policy in favor of 
arbitration then enter into play as a presumptive, gap-filling default 
rule. Thus, under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretive methodology, 
though arbitration is the presumptive default rule, the rule’s practical 
effect is circumscribed; the rule is only rendered functionally 
operative where, after threshold-level judicial scrutiny of the specific 
statute at issue, a court can find no evidence suggesting that 
Congress preempted the presumptive default rule with a more 
specific, contrary mandate.  
On the other hand, the courts in Gay and Picard viewed their 
tasks in a way that gave broader importance to the federal policy 
favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements.81 While, like 
the Greenwood court, the Gay court noted that Congress was free to 
override the policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements by 
contrary command, early on in its opinion the Gay court clearly 
emphasized that the case “implicate[d] the Federal Arbitration Act” 
and further noted that the FAA was designed to overcome 
“longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”82 More 
significantly, the court noted critical language from the Gilmer 
opinion suggesting that the policy in favor of arbitration should play 
 
Congress must have intended to preclude the arbitrability of CROA disputes. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2009); Gay v. 
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 378 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 82. See Gay, 511 F.3d at 378.  
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a role throughout a court’s process of interpretive analysis.83 
Therefore, under the Gay/Picard interpretive methodology, because 
the general rule favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
operates as a background principle from the earliest stages of 
statutory interpretation, it functionally operates as a canonical rule 
that resolves any statutory ambiguity in favor of the enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate.  
B. Substantive Ramifications of Distinct Interpretive Methodologies 
The distinct functional roles of the presumption favoring the 
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate under the two interpretive 
methodologies highlighted in the previous subsection are likely to 
create important, substantive differences in interpretive outcomes. 
First and foremost, under the Greenwood methodology, it is clear 
that agreements to arbitrate will be upheld less frequently than under 
the Gay/Picard methodology. This is because, under Greenwood’s 
methodology, before the presumption favoring arbitration comes 
into play the court must use general statutory interpretive techniques 
to interpret the statute, probing carefully for some sort of specific 
statutory intention that overrides the general presumption. On the 
other hand, under the Gay/Picard methodology, unless a statutory 
scheme is very clear in stating that arbitration is not permitted, close 
questions will be resolved in favor of arbitration at the interpretive 
stage. Thus, under the Gay/Picard methodology the policy favoring 
arbitration plays a role earlier in the process of statutory inquiry and 
is more hospitable to arbitration.  
An additional difference between the two methodologies is that, 
under the Greenwood methodology, courts that do not favor 
arbitration will more easily be able to find ways to avoid enforcing 
agreements to arbitrate at the interpretive stage when the 
presumption in favor of arbitration is inoperable. Conversely, under 
the Gay/Picard interpretive method, even judges that disfavor 
agreements to arbitrate will have a difficult time invalidating such 
agreements, because this methodology requires that ambiguities in 
specific statutes be resolved in favor of arbitration. Consequently, 
 
 83. See id. at 379 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 
(1991)) (“Throughout such an inquiry, it should be kept in mind that questions of 
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring 
arbitration.”). 
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based upon the aforementioned substantive differences, it is clear 
that under Greenwood’s methodology, arbitration agreements are 
relatively disfavored as compared to under the Gay/Picard 
interpretive methodology. 
C. Greenwood—Infidelity to Supreme Court Precedent 
The Greenwood case’s interpretive methodology, which is 
relatively inhospitable to arbitration agreements, is out of sync with 
relevant Supreme Court precedent because this precedent suggests 
that the federal policy favoring arbitration should play a role 
throughout the process of statutory interpretation84—and, similarly, 
that the policy should resolve ambiguity in favor of arbitration.85 The 
Greenwood opinion failed to even note these critical components of 
relevant Supreme Court precedent. The court’s failure to note these 
critical components led the court to believe that it was justified in 
distinguishing relevant Supreme Court precedent based merely upon 
factual distinctions. The Greenwood majority thereby failed to 
recognize that embodied within the precedent it distinguished was a 
portable interpretive methodology that the Supreme Court has 
nimbly employed across a variety of statutory regimes in creating a 
presumptive rule that is highly hospitable to arbitration.86 The 
Greenwood majority overlooked the fact that what relevant Supreme 
Court precedent now essentially requires is that, if a statute has a 
plausible construction that permits the enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate, these agreements are to be upheld.87 A clear, unequivocal, 
contrary command from Congress in a specific statutory regime is 
required to override this general presumption favoring arbitration.88 
D. Greenwood—Legacy Going Forward 
Because Greenwood misapplied Supreme Court precedent, its 
decision will create substantial confusion for courts within the Ninth 
Circuit. Various other statutory regimes likely contain provisions that 
 
 84. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. 
 85. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 
(1985) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 
(1983)). 
 86. See supra text accompanying notes 21–32.  
 87. See id.  
 88. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
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could be construed to provide individuals or businesses with the 
right to a judicial adjudication of a controversy. In light of 
Greenwood, courts will face difficulty knowing when they should 
enforce other agreements to arbitrate. Under Greenwood, agreements 
to arbitrate involving statutory claims are no longer presumptively 
valid at the statutory interpretation stage because the Greenwood 
interpretive methodology does not apply the presumption in favor of 
arbitrability until late in the statutory interpretive process. On the 
other hand, under Supreme Court precedent, these agreements to 
arbitrate are very clearly presumptively valid at the interpretive stage. 
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to clarify the presumptive 
validity of such agreements.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s Greenwood decision misapplied Supreme 
Court arbitration agreement precedent by applying a statutory 
interpretation methodology that treated agreements to arbitrate 
inhospitably instead of properly regarding them as presumptively 
valid. The Federal Arbitration Act, in connection with relevant 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting it, creates a legal regime that 
is highly hospitable to the enforcement of arbitration agreements. In 
cases involving statutory challenges to arbitration agreements, this 
legal regime requires courts to apply the policy favoring arbitration 
as they interpret statutes. Where a given statute has any permissible 
construction that will allow for the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, that construction must be adopted. Congress must 
speak clearly to override this strong presumption favoring the 
enforceability of arbitration awards. The Ninth Circuit split from its 
sister circuits in Greenwood because it did not apply the strong 
presumption in favor of the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
as it interpreted the CROA. By applying the appropriate interpretive 
methodology, the Ninth Circuit would have concluded that the  
arbitration agreement was valid, thereby avoiding the creation of a 
circuit split. 
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